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Charles Noussair and Jonathon Silver 
 
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private 
values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and 
efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price 
sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than 
both the risk- neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner-pay auction.  Bidders’ decisions move 
closer to equilibrium levels over time in the auction. 
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1. Introduction 
  Many examples of competition exist with the property that multiple players exert effort 
or expend resources in an attempt to gain a benefit, and the losers’ effort or expenditure goes 
uncompensated. Students vying for grades in a class with a curve, lobbyists attempting to gain a 
favor from politicians, or rival companies battling to release a new innovative good on the market 
are just a few instances of this type of interaction. An auction, in which all players pay the 
amount of their bids, but the person or the firm that bids the highest wins the prize, is a simple 
and natural way to model such competition. Bidders’ expenditure in the auction can be 
interpreted as a monetary cost or a non-monetary cost of effort. 
  The theoretical analysis of auctions, beginning with Vickrey (1961) is one of the richest 
and most highly developed research areas of applied game theory.  The main focus has been on   3
winner-pay auctions, where only the player(s) who obtain units are required to make payments. 
However, in the past decade, economists have begun to study auctions where bidders forfeit their 
bids even if they do not obtain an item (see for example Baye et al. (1993) or Krishna and 
Morgan, (1997)). In a single-prize all-pay auction, each player submits a nonrefundable bid, but 
only the highest bidder receives the prize. This logic can represent many types of winner-take-all 
contest, such as a patent race, political lobbying for a government concession, or some forms of 
academic competition. 
  All experimental studies of all-pay auctions of which we are aware have found that 
participants tend to bid more aggressively than in Nash equilibrium, implying overdissipation of 
the rent available for sale in the auction (Potters et al., 1998; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and 
Smorodinsky 1999; Barut et al., 2002).  This tendency to overbid is not specific to all-pay 
auctions; results from studies of first-price winner-pay auctions (Coppinger et al., 1980; Cox et 
al., 1982; Harrison, 1989; Kagel et al., 1987; and Kagel and Levin, 1993), have indicated 
overbidding relative to equilibrium levels as well. Most previous experimental studies of all-pay 
auctions (Potters et al., 1998; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 1999) have 
studied environments with complete information, in which all bidders’ valuations of the unit(s) 
for sale are common knowledge,
1 while Barut et al. (2002) consider a multiple-unit all-pay 
auction under incomplete information. The experiment reported here focuses on the properties of 
single-unit all-pay auctions in an environment with incomplete information.  
  We find that bidders with low valuations for the object tend to bid close to, though 
usually below, equilibrium predictions. However, bidding higher than equilibrium levels is 
common for bidders with high valuations. Many participants bid as if they do not want to commit 
substantial amounts of money unless they have a high probability of winning the auction. These 
patterns of behavior are consistent with the presence of risk aversion (Fibich et al., 2004), as well 
as analogous to the pattern observed by Barut et al. (2002), who studied behavior in multiple-unit 
all-pay auctions under incomplete information. It also corresponds to the phenomenon observed   4
in recent experimental work on effort in organizations by Mueller and Schotter (2003), in which 
high-ability workers exert greater than optimal effort, and low-ability workers drop out of the 
competition. Our revenue results are also consistent with the previous literature, in that the 
auction yields higher revenue than in equilibrium. Furthermore, we conjecture that the all-pay 
auction generates higher revenue than a winner-pay auction under similar parameters.  A dynamic 
pattern of behavior is evident as the game is repeated. Many bidders suffer considerable losses in 
the first few periods of their session, but quickly make the adjustment to bid lower than they had 
bid previously, albeit still above equilibrium levels, for the rest of the auctions in the session. 
  Section two contains a derivation of an equilibrium for the auction in the environment we 
study. Section three describes the protocol of the experiment, section four describes the results, 
and section five is a brief summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Predictions 
In this section we calculate a Bayesian equilibrium to the auction game we study. The 
equilibrium is monotonic, in that all players’ bids are strictly increasing in own valuations.  We 
also assume symmetry of bidding strategies so that every bidder uses the same strategy. The 
assumption of symmetry is imposed because (a) the symmetric equilibrium is simple to calculate 
and (b) there is reason to believe that it is the most plausible equilibrium that might emerge in the 
experiment; our game is symmetric and simultaneous with no obvious means to coordinate on an 
asymmetric equilibrium.  
 
2.1. Environment and Auction Rules  
The environment is the independent private values framework as introduced by Vickrey 
(1961). Suppose that n bidders, indexed by i, each receive a valuation vi for a good to be sold in 
an auction. Each bidder i draws vi from a uniform distribution F(v) on the interval [0, ], that is 
_
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common to all bidders.  Let bi denote i’s bid and let Bi define i’s overall strategy as a function of 
his type so that bi = Bi(vi). We require that bi ≥ 0. Each bidder knows the number of other 
participants, his own valuation, that there is only one unit for sale in each period, and that all 
bidders draw their valuations from the same common uniform distribution.  However, bidders do 
not know what values other bidders have for the unit being sold. All of the above is common 
knowledge.   
The rules of the all-pay auction game are the following. After drawing his own valuation, 
each bidder simultaneously submits a bid.  Each bidder pays the amount of his bid, regardless of 
whether or not he obtains the unit. If player i does not submit the highest bid among the n players, 
he incurs a loss of –bi.  If i submits the highest bid among the players he receives the unit, earns 
value vi from the unit and pays bi, and thus his total payoff is equal to vi - bi. 
 
2.2. Derivation of Equilibrium   
The expected payoff to bidder i is denoted by 
(1)      Eπi = vi∗P(highest bid)−bi, 
where P(highest bid) equals the probability that bi is the highest bid in the auction and therefore 
player i wins the unit for sale. Consider a symmetric strictly monotonic Bayesian equilibrium 
bidding function in this game, where players bid higher as their valuations increase, and use a 
common bidding strategy.
2 Since an individual’s equilibrium bidding function, denoted as Bi(vi), 
is strictly monotonic, it is invertible. Since all bidders use the same strategy in a symmetric 
equilibrium, Bi(vi) = B(v) for all i. We denote the inverse of B(v) as V(b). 
Since agents use a common monotonic bidding strategy, the probability that individual i 
submits the highest bid equals the probability that i has the highest valuation.  This equals the 
probability that all other bidders have lower valuations. This can be calculated directly from the 
distribution of valuations. Substituting into equation (1), we have:   6
(2)        ,  i
N
i i i b b V F v E − =
−1 ))] ( ( [ π
where N is the number of bidders.  In our experiment, where N = 6 and the distribution of 
valuations is uniform on
3 [0,1000] so that F(V(bi)) = V(bi)/1000, and P(highest bid) = 
))] ( ( [ i b V F
5, player i’s objective function becomes: 









A necessary condition for equilibrium is that bidder i chooses bi to maximize equation 
(3).  The first-order condition is: 















Since the function V(bi) is symmetric, we can substitute V(bi) = vi, and obtain:   
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Because V(bi) is the inverse of B(vi), V  must then equal  ) ( ' i b ) ( '
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Integrating B’(vi), we solve for B(vi) and obtain a symmetric, strictly monotonic equilibrium 
bidding function, given by (8). 
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It remains to specify an initial condition. The obvious condition is that B(0)=0 because it is a 
dominated strategy to bid an amount greater than one’s valuation and bids are constrained to be 
non-negative. Thus, we set C = 0 in equation (8), and the following expression satisfies the 
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It can be readily verified that the second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied. 
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium bidding function. On the horizontal axis are the valuations vi 
and on the vertical axis are the bids bi.  Although bi > 0 for all vi > 0  the function does not reach a 
value of bi = 1 until vi = 326. The maximum possible bid consistent with equilibrium behavior 
is 33 . 833 ) 1000 ( = B . 
 
     [Figure 1: About Here] 
 
3. Procedures of the Experiment 
We conducted five experimental sessions, each consisting of one practice period and 25 
periods that counted toward subjects’ earnings.  In each session, six subjects were given the role 
of bidders in an auction to purchase a fictitious object. There was one object auctioned in each 
period to the six bidders. In each period, bidders were given independently drawn valuations for 
obtaining the object for sale that period.  The valuations were denominated in terms of an 
experimental currency and were integers drawn from the discrete uniform distribution on the [1, 
1000] interval.  The conversion rate of units of experimental currency to $US was 250 
units/$1.00.  New valuations were drawn each period so that an individual’s valuation typically 
differed from period to period. Valuations were independent across bidders within a period as 
well for individuals over time. 
All five sessions were conducted at Emory University using undergraduate students 
recruited from economics courses. No individual participated in more than one session during the 
study.  All auctions were conducted manually rather than being computerized.  Every subject 
received a $20 participation fee, announced at the beginning of each session, and this money   8
could be used to pay off any losses incurred during the series of auctions.  In each period, bidders 
simultaneously submitted bids, in terms of experimental currency, for the single object available 
for sale during the period. The bidder with the highest bid won the item and received earnings 
equal to his valuation for the object minus his bid.  Every other subject incurred a loss equal to 
the amount of his bid.
4 Table 1 shows the average, maximum, and minimum earnings among 
subjects for each of the five sessions. 
 
   [Table  1:  About  Here] 
 
There was no communication allowed between subjects during the experiment. The 
information available to subjects at any point during a session was the following. Each participant 
had the information specified in the independent private values framework described above.  
Additionally, each subject knew the history of all bids from earlier auctions in the session, which 
was displayed on the blackboard for the entire session. Bidder identifiers and valuations were not 
displayed so it was not possible to associate a bid with a particular player or valuation. Players 
did not know the valuations that they would receive in future periods. When they turned in their 
record sheet to the experimenter at the end of each period, the experimenter wrote down their 
valuation for the next period in the appropriate column. The instructions for the experiment and a 




4.1. Revenue, Efficiency, and Comparison with Winner-Pay Auctions  
We first consider the aggregate measures of outcomes that are generally of the greatest 
interest in the study of auctions: the revenue to the auctioneer and the overall surplus to the two 
parties.  We compare observed revenue in our experiment to the Bayesian equilibrium level and   9
to previous data from winner-pay first-price sealed bid auctions reported by Cox et al. (1982, 
1988). They investigate the first-price auction within an identical environment to ours: an 
independent private values information structure, six bidders, and a uniform distribution of 
valuations. Our observed revenue is higher than both benchmarks, the equilibrium level and the 
winner-pay first-price auction level.
6 Table 2 shows a comparison of the observed revenue with 
the Bayesian equilibrium revenue for the actual realizations of valuations for the period.  In four 
out the five sessions, the average observed revenue considerably exceeded the equilibrium level.   
 
[Table 2: About Here] 
 
The table shows that 86 of 125 periods yield higher revenue than the equilibrium level. 
Average revenue per period is 1055, which is 47.7% higher than the predicted revenue of 714, 
and even higher than the maximum possible valuation for the object (1000). A t-test, under the 
conservative assumption that each session is the unit of observation, rejects the hypothesis that 
the average revenue in the session is less than or equal to the Bayesian equilibrium revenue at the 
five percent level (t = 3.515, p < .01, n = 5). This result is analogous to those obtained in previous 
studies of all-pay auctions in other environments (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1999; 
Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 1999; Barut et al., 2002) that have shown that revenue is significantly 
greater than equilibrium levels in all-pay auctions. In conjunction with previous studies, our 
results suggest that more aggressive bidding than under non-cooperative game theoretic models 
may be a general feature of all-pay auction games.  
It appears that revenue in the all-pay auction, at least for our parameters, is greater than 
under a winner-pay first-price auction. We compare the average revenue obtained here with that 
from the first-price sealed bid auction reported in Cox et al. (1982, 1988), using a pooled-variance 
t test.
7 Each period in each study is used as an observation. The Cox et al. data is appropriate as a 
basis for comparison because it consists of auctions in which six bidders bid for one item, the   10
bidders valuations were independently drawn from a uniform distribution and were private 
information, so that the structure of the environment was identical to ours. We reject the 
hypothesis that average revenue is equal under the two auction types at a five percent level of 
significance (t = 2.65, p < .05), in favor of the alternative that the all-pay auction generates higher 
revenue than the winner-pay auction.  
Efficient allocations occur when the bidder with the highest valuation also submits the 
highest bid, and therefore wins the item. A natural measure of efficiency is the ratio of the 
valuation of the winning bidder to the highest valuation any bidder holds (Plott and Smith, 1978). 
An efficiency level equal to 1 implies that the highest-valued bidder purchased the item. The data 
for efficiency, also listed in Table 2, shows that in 62.4% of periods, an efficient allocation 
occurred. Average efficiency equaled 89.1%. While this is clearly higher than would result from a 
random allocation of the unit or a flawed institution, it is lower than typically obtained in winner-
pay first-price auctions. For the data that Cox et al. (1982, 1988) report for six bidders and the 
same parametric structure we employ here, an average allocative efficiency of 98.26% was 
obtained.
8 
   
4.2. Individual Bidding Behavior 
Figures 2a-2e display the individual bid data from the five sessions that comprised the 
experiment.  The bids of each of the six subjects in a session are shown with a different symbol, 
and the smooth line represents the Bayesian equilibrium bidding function calculated in section 
two.  The graphs show a rather similar relationship between bids and valuations in different 
sessions.  For lower valuations, a large majority of bids is at or close to zero, while high 
valuations are generally accompanied by higher than equilibrium bids. However, there is 
considerable heterogeneity of behavior between subjects.   
 
  [Figures 2a – 2e: About Here]   11
 
Although only 39% (293 out of 750) of all bids exceeded the equilibrium level, excess 
bidding was most evident for valuations within a particular range. Zero bidding is common; 
bidders with valuations of 500 or below bid zero 67.6% of the time. The percentage of subjects 
submitting zero bids declines steadily as valuations increase, rather than abruptly decreasing as 
would occur if bidders were using a common pure strategy.  
For valuations below 800, the majority of bids is below the equilibrium level. The 
percentage exceeding equilibrium is fairly constant over the range from 0 to 700, above which it 
increases considerably. For valuations above 800, the majority of bids exceeds the Bayesian 
equilibrium level.  The bids that exceed the equilibrium levels for valuations greater than 800 did 
so to an extent sufficient to more than offset the revenue loss relative to equilibrium from the 
lower than predicted bids observed for low valuations.  
While the high bidding of those with valuations above 800 accounts for the greater than 
predicted revenue, the heterogeneity of behavior across individuals reveals the source of the 
inefficiency. Although behavior is reasonably common across individuals when they have low 
valuations, the variability of bids submitted by players with valuations above 700 suggests that 
inefficient allocations may be occurring, in that bidders with the highest values often fail to obtain 
the unit for sale. This pattern is particularly evident in session four.  Closer inspection of figure 
2d, which displays the data for this session, reveals a tendency on the part of bidders 3 and 6 to 
pursue a different type of strategy from the other four bidders.
9 Their bids are roughly a linear 
function of their valuations, while the other four bidders use the more typical strategy of zero or 
near-zero bidding for valuations below a threshold and higher than equilibrium bidding for higher 
valuations.  This pattern of lower than equilibrium bidding for low and higher than equilibrium 
bidding for high valuations is consistent with the multiple-unit all-pay auction data reported in 
Barut et al. (2002) and with results from Mueller and Schotter’s (2003) study of effort in 
organizations.     12
The aggregate pattern of individual behavior in our data is broadly consistent with the 
presence of risk aversion. Fibich et al. (2004) show, using perturbation analysis, that in an all-pay 
auction with independent private values and a small degree of risk aversion on the part of all 
bidders, the following patterns hold. (1) Buyers with low values bid lower than they would under 
risk-neutrality, (2) Bidders with high values bid higher than if they were risk neutral, and (3) 
buyers’ expected utilities are lower than they would be under a first-price winner-pay auction. All 
of these patterns are observed here. Low valued players typically bid zero, consistent with (1), 
while those with high values bid higher than risk-neutral equilibrium levels, as (2) specifies. 
Expected earnings are negative, and therefore lower than in first-price auctions, which is in 
accordance with (3). However, because there are strong behavioral patterns in other types of 
auctions that are inconsistent with risk-aversion (see for example Kagel and Levin, 1993, or 
Kagel, 1995), other explanations for the patterns observed here may well be at least as important 
as risk aversion.
10 
We next consider whether or not participants change their behavior as they become more 
experienced with the auction process. Bidders begin with no prior experience, and their decisions 






the absolute difference between the player i’s bid in period t of session j and the equilibrium bid 






average bias of i’s bid. While the absolute difference is a measure of dispersion, bias is a measure 
of the extent of average over-or underbidding relative to equilibrium, with a positive value 
indicating a bias toward overbidding. The figures show the data by period, pooled across bidders 
and sessions. They illustrate that at the beginning of the sessions the average bid greatly exceeds 
the equilibrium level, but rapidly declines over the first five periods. However, the bias in bids is 
fairly constant after period 5, and remains positive, indicating long-term bidding in excess of the 
equilibrium level. Bidders appear to learn quite early the consequences of severe overbidding. 
This causes the rapid decline in bids relative to equilibrium predictions during the first few   13
periods. However, it appears that the feedback from moderate overbidding is not sufficiently 
powerful to lead agents to lower their bids to the equilibrium level, at least over the time horizon 
that we are able to observe in our experiment. The incidence of zero bidding does not show a 
systematic pattern over time, with 51.3%, 50%, 44%, 39%, and 52.7% of bids equaling zero in 
periods 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, and 21-25, respectively. 
 
           [Figures 3a and 3b: About Here] 
 
To consider the convergence process of bids relative to equilibrium levels over time, we 







*  = β11D1(1/t) + … + β15D5(1/t) + β2((t-1)/t) + uit,   (10) 
 
where j indexes the session, the Dj are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 for session j and 
zero for other sessions, and t represents the market period. Notice that in the first period of 
session one, (D1/t) equals 1 but all of the (Dj/t) terms for j ≠ 1, as well as the (t-1)/t term, equal 
zero. Therefore, the β1j coefficients can be interpreted as indicating the origin of the dependent 
variable at the beginning of session j. As t→∞, the Dj/t terms approach zero while the (t-1)/t term 
approaches one so that the β2 coefficient indicates the value that the dependent variable 
asymptotically approaches. The specification allows heterogeneity early on between the 
individual sessions, but assumes convergence to a common asymptote in all sessions. It accords 
well with many types of experiments, which exhibit more between-session variability early than 
late in the experimental sessions. 
The results of the estimation are shown in table 3. The estimated coefficients of the 
model with the Absolute Difference as the dependent variable are given in the second column,   14
and those for the Bias are in the third column. The standard errors are given in parentheses. The 
data in the table lead to two main observations. The first is that all of the β terms are significantly 
positive. The fact that β2 is positive for the Bias equation indicates that even if the declining trend 
in bids is extrapolated into the infinite future, the average bid would remain significantly greater 
than the Bayesian equilibrium level, confirming the visual impression conveyed in figures 3a and 
3b. Average bids are converging to a level above the equilibrium. The second observation is that 
all five of the β1j terms are greater than β2, which is consistent with a trend of declining bids 
relative to equilibrium predictions. Thus while the average bid does not converge to the 
equilibrium level, it is moving in its direction. 
 
[Table 3: About Here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
  The revenue from the sealed bid first price all-pay auction that we have studied here 
exceeds the Bayesian equilibrium revenue in the independent private values environment. This 
result accords with studies of the auction in other environments. Furthermore, the all-pay auction 
appears to generate higher revenue than the more widely studied and used first-price winner-pay 
auction. This result does not extend to the multi-unit case, for which Barut et al (2002) find that in 
multi-unit generalizations of the auctions studied here, there is no significant revenue difference 
between all-pay and winner-pay variants. While we obtain the result that revenue in the all-pay 
auction exceeds the winner-pay auction by comparing our data with those of a previous study that 
may have used somewhat different procedures, the fact that average revenue in the all-pay 
auction exceeds the highest possible valuation gives us confidence that the finding is not due to 
any methodological differences. It is implausible that a first-price winner-pay auction would yield 
average revenue greater than even the expected highest valuation, let alone the highest possible   15
valuation, because of the transparently dominated nature of bidding more than one’s valuation in 
such an auction.  
At the individual level, we observe extensive use of a dichotomous bidding strategy. For 
relatively low valuations, bids of zero are common, and for high valuations, bids that exceed 
equilibrium levels are typical. Thus in this form of competition, agents appear to exert either a 
great deal or very little effort, where effort is represented in our experiment by a monetary 
commitment. This pattern, aggressive bidding on the part of those with high valuations and 
passive bidding by those with low valuations, is consistent with risk aversion on the part of 
bidders, although of course the existence of the pattern does not prove that risk aversion is the 
cause. Furthermore, subjects are heterogeneous with regard to the valuation at which they tend to 
change their approach from non-competitive to competitive. This heterogeneity, in cases where 
the highest-valued bidder behaves non-competitively, can create inefficient allocations. Indeed, 
we observe more inefficiency here than is typically the case in winner-pay auctions.  
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This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making.  The instructions are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable 
amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  The 
experiment will be broken up into a series of 25 periods in which you will be bidding in a series 
of auctions for units of a good called X.  You will be given a Record Sheet to keep track of 
results. You are not to reveal the results on your Record Sheet to any other participant. 
In each period, you will see a number on your Record Sheet in the column labeled 
“Redemption Value.”  This number is your value for the product, and indicates the amount of 
experimental currency you will receive if you obtain a unit of X in the auction that period.  Your 
Redemption Value is chosen randomly before the experiment and is equally likely to be any 
integer between 1 and 1000.  You will receive a new randomly chosen redemption value in each 
period, and your redemption value will typically be different than the one of every other player.  
Other players’ redemption values are independent of your redemption value, that is, each other 
player’s number is still equally likely to be any number between 1 and 1000, no matter what your 
number happens to be. 
You can obtain units of X by participating in the market process which is described 
below. 
 
The Auction Process 
 
Each period, you will be grouped with five other participants.  There will be only one unit 
sold to each group each period. 
During each period, you may submit a bid for one unit of the commodity by filling out 
the column entitled “Bid” for the appropriate period on the Record Sheet.  After all participants 
have submitted their bids, the highest bid in each group will be accepted and that bidder will   19
receive the unit of X awarded.  If there is a tie for the highest bid, the unit is randomly assigned to 
the tied buyers by a coin flip.   
In this auction, you pay the amount of your bid regardless of whether or not you receive a 
unit of X.  A practice round will initially be conducted to make sure that all participants 
understand the auction process. 
 
Determining Your Earnings 
 
Please refer to your record sheet to determine your earnings.  You must record your earnings on 
your record sheet at the end of each period.  In column 4, labeled Value of Units Received, enter 
your redemption value if you made the highest bid for the period and 0 if you did not. Subtract 
column 3 from column 4, and these are your earnings for the period, which are to be entered in 
column 5.   
Example:  Someone with a redemption value of 750 bids 500 in an auction and has the 
highest bid.  This person would enter 750 into the Value of Units Received column and 250, 750-
500, into the Earnings for Period column on the record sheet.  Another person with a redemption 
value of 700 bids 400 in the same auction.  This person would enter 0 into Value of Units 
Received and –400, 0-400, into Earnings for Period. 
At the conclusion of the experiment, add of all of the earnings for each period and enter 
the total at the bottom of the record sheet.  The currency used in this market is “francs,” and the 
total earnings will be converted into dollars at a rate of 250 francs/dollar.  This value will be 
added (or subtracted if negative) to the $20 participation fee and will be paid out at the conclusion 
of the experiment. 
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Practice 500       
1 577       
2 47       
3 157       
4 381       
5 823       
6 717       
7 321       
8 614       
9 994       
10 881       
11 34      
12 216       
13 928       
14 641       
15 160       
16 249       
17 883       
18 546       
19 432       
20 572       
21 139       
22 631       
23 301       
24 465       
25 385       
Total Earnings for the Auction is:   
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Number of Subjects Earnings 
Less Than Participation Fee 
1  $20.75  $27.80 $13.50 2/6 
2  $15.45  $19.98 $12.00 6/6 
3  $15.01  $17.60 $11.99 6/6 
4 $9.44  $20.66  -$2.24  5/6 
5 $15.00  $19.21  $5.87  6/6 
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Table 2
*: Average Revenue and Efficiency, All Sessions 
Session Average 





Efficiency = 1 
1 -3.62  10/25  .906  15/25 
2 386.90  20/25  .937  17/25 
3 354.27  18/25  .873  16/25 
4 597.23  20/25  .822  11/25 
5 366.23  18/25  .919  19/25 




                                                 
* In Table 2, Average Revenue – BE equals the average difference between the actual revenue and the 
Bayesian equilibrium revenue per period during each session.  Revenue>BE indicates the number of 
periods in each session that the total revenue exceeds the Bayesian equilibrium revenue for the actual 
valuations bidders held in the period.   23
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Figure 3a: Average Absolute Difference Between Observed and 
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ENDNOTES 
1.  Anderson et al. (1998) show that in the case of complete information, overdissipation is 
consistent with a logit equilibrium, in which agents may commit “errors” by choosing 
actions that do not have the highest expected payoffs, but the probability of choosing a 
particular action is increasing in its expected payoff. 
2.  See Krishna and Morgan (1997) or Krishna (2002) for a derivation of the Bayesian 
equilibrium for more general cases. 
3.  Although we use a discrete uniform distribution in the experiment, we derive the 
equilibrium here assuming a continuous distribution. The main analytical difference is 
that if the distribution is discrete, the possibility of a tie for the highest bid must be 
considered, while with a continuous distribution of types and strictly monotonic 
strategies, the probability of a tie is zero. With 1000 different valuations (each integer in 
the 1-1000 interval) and a uniform distribution, as in our experiment, the probability of a 
tie for the highest valuation and therefore for highest bid is extremely small. 
4.  If a subject had overall net losses for the auction, the amount of the loss would be 
deducted from the $20 participation fee while positive earnings would be added to the 
fee.  In principle, a player could lose more than the initial twenty dollars.  This only 
occurred for one person in the entire study. An individual in Session 4 lost $22.24 in the 
auction for overall losses of $2.24 for the session.  In this case, the individual did not 
receive any money for his participation in the experiment. Since cumulative earnings are 
not calculated after each period, the subject appeared to be unaware that he had sustained 
more than the maximum allowable losses. His cumulative earnings became negative in 
period 23. 
5.  The sheet in the appendix contains the valuation of the individual for all 25 periods. 
However, during the experiment itself, individuals did not observe the valuations for   33
future periods. They knew only their valuations for the previous and current period at any 
time. 
6.  While the procedures may have differed slightly between our study and Cox et al. (1988) 
it is clear that revenue is higher here than it would be in a first-price winner-pay auction. 
All studies of the first-price winner pay auction have reported that revenue is below the 
highest valuation held among the bidders, although higher than the Bayesian equilibrium 
assuming risk neutrality. Here average revenue exceeds the highest valuation held among 
the bidders. In the winner pay auction, the highest bidder must use a dominated strategy 
for revenue to be greater than the highest valuation, while this is not the case for the all-
pay auction we study here. 
7.  Valuations in the experiment of Cox et al. (1988) were drawn from a uniform distribution 
on [0, 16.9] in contrast to our interval of [0,1000]. We normalized our data for 
comparison by multiplying all bids in our study by 0.0169, and then calculating the mean 
and variance of the resulting transformed bids. 
8.  These very high efficiency results that Cox et al. obtain are typical of first-price winner-
pay auctions. See for example, Kagel et al., 1987, who report efficiency levels of 98% to 
99.5% in private value first-price winner-pay auctions. 
9.  Bidder six was the only person from the entire experiment to lose more money than the 
twenty-dollar participation fee. 
10. A explanation of the deviations from the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium based on the 
existence of a utility of winning the auction cannot be a complete explanation for the 
pattern we observe. If a utility of winning exists, then bids would exceed Bayesian 
equilibrium levels for both low and high valuations. The pattern of underbidding on the 
part of players with low valuations seems inconsistent with the existence of a utility of 
winning the auction. 
 